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Exposure, Manifestation of Loss,
Injury-in-Fact, Continuous Trigger:
The Insurance Coverage Quagmire
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that twenty years ago, "A," a chemical corporation, buried
substantial amounts of contaminants on its property. Furthermore,
assume the following facts:
1. In Year One, A, while insured by Insurer One, ineffectively dis-
posed of certain toxic chemicals.'
2. In Year Two, while A was insured by Insurer Two, the chemicals
continued to slowly leak and the contamination progressively
worsened.2
3. In Year Three, while A was insured by Insurer Three, property
damage on the surrounding properties became apparent.'
The surrounding property owners sue A, and all three insurers deny
coverage.4 Typically, Insurer One and Insurer Two would argue for the
1. Scenarios such as this are quite common. For example, a majority of the water
supply in Boston is contaminated by toxic chemicals which pose a particular risk to
people who drink from private wells. Health Risks from Boston Wells Reported,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 10, 1993, at A16.
2. See, e.g., Harman v. American Casualty Co., 155 F. Supp. 612, 613 (C.D. Cal.
1957) (finding that damage from land slippage was "substantial and continuous");
California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 467 (Ct. App.
1983) (finding property damage caused by pool leakage was "accumulating and be-
coming progressively more severe"). In the oil industry, leakage of contaminants is so
common that oil producers' policies generally exclude "bodily injury or property dam-
age arising out of discharge, dispersal, release or escape of oil." Mitchell L. Lathrop,
What is the Role of Insurance in Toxic Tort Cases?, in Toxic ToRTS PRACTICE GUIDE
§ 32.07 (2d ed. 1992).
3. Property damage from toxic contamination can come from a variety of sources.
Los Angeles County will spend over $700,000 testing soil and water at an abandoned
landfill, possibly contaminated by toxic chemicals originating from illegal drug labs
shut down nearly two decades ago. Amy Pyle, Costs Mount in Tests for Toxic Con-
tamination at Pitchess Jail, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1993, at B3.
4. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1043 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1981) (insurers denying all coverage or accepting
court to adopt the "manifestation of loss" theory of triggering cover-
age,' under which liability would attach to Insurer Three.6 Insurer
Three, however, would argue the "exposure trigger" theory,7 under
which liability would attach to Insurer One and Insurer Two. Finally,
the insured would argue for the "continuous trigger" theory,' which
would warrant coverage by all three insurers. The court is thus con-
fronted with a clear dilemma over how and to whom liability should
attach, and must base its decision on manifestation of loss, exposure
trigger, continuous trigger, or possibly another coverage theory.
Unfortunately, this hypothetical does not represent a unique situation.
Lawsuits involving toxic and asbestos contamination are filed with
increasing frequency.' Often the claimants seek liability for contamina-
tion or injuries that occurred over a substantial period of time.' ° The
defendants in such cases invariably turn to their insurers for defense
and indemnification against such lawsuits." As a result, coverage dis-
only partial responsibility).
5. For a discussion of the manifestation-of-loss theory, see infra notes 138-70 and
accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d
267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that in a case involving defective bricks all
damage accrued during the policy when the "spalling first became apparent"). In the
present hypothetical, Insurer One and Insurer Two would lobby the court to interpret
the trigger question similar to the district court's reasoning in Schering Corp. v.
Home Ins. Co., 544 F. Supp. 613, 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 712
F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that coverage "is predicated not on the act ...but
upon the result").
7. For discussion regarding the exposure theory, see infra notes 102-37 and ac-
companying text.
8. For discussion regarding the continuous trigger theory, see infra notes 182-223
and accompanying text.
9. For example, one commentator estimated that more than 15,000 claimants have
filed suit against manufacturers of asbestos products. Rebecca C. Earnest, Recent
Development: Insurance Law and Asbestosis-When is Coverage of a Progressive
Disease Triggered?, 58 WASH. L. REV. 63, 63 (1982). Furthermore, some experts pre-
dict that these contaminants may ultimately result in nearly 5.6 million deaths in the
United States. Id. at 63 n.3.
10. At least one court has recognized "the unique character" of discerning policy
coverage of diseases with long latency periods. ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 764 F.2d 968, 971, 973 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding exposure to contaminant, continu-
ing exposure, and manifestation of asbestosis triggered coverage of three different
policies).
11. Generally, an insurer's duty to defend is independent and broader than the
duty to indemnify. See, e.g., Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Biltmore Const. Co., 767 F.2d
810, 811-12 (lth Cir. 1985) (holding insurer's duty to defend is independent and
broader than its duty to indemnify since an insurer may be forced to defend a suit
where it is later determined that coverage does not apply). An insurer, however, "has
no duty to defend a suit brought by a third party against the insured where the peti-
tion or complaint in such suit upon its face alleges a state of facts that fails to bring
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putes have "erupted, fed by the fires of the liability explosion" in the
areas of toxic and asbestos contamination.
2
In particular, a dispute often arises between an insurer whose policy
is in effect when the damage is discovered and the insurer whose policy
was in effect when the damage occurred.' The dispute is intensified
by the fact that certain types of damage or injury-causing occurrences,
like toxic contamination or construction defects, are often undetectable
until significant damage has been suffered.'4 Similarly, certain diseases
possess extended latency periods, where there is a prolonged amount
of time between manifestation of the injury and the event causing the
injury. Courts have traditionally forced only the insurer whose policy
was in effect at the "triggering period," the time of discovery of the
injury, to provide indemnification or to defend the insured."
This situation poses a difficult dilemma for the courts. To impose a
duty to defend on the insurer covering the latter period is to ignore the
fact that all or most of the damage occurred during the earlier policy
period.7 To impose a duty to defend on the earlier insurer potentially
the case within the coverage of the policy." 14 MARK S. RHODE, COUCH ON INSURANCE
2d, § 51:45 (Rev. ed. 1982). See also 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE,
§ 4682 at 25 (Berdal ed. 1979).
12. John P. Arness & Randall D. Eliason, Insurance Coverage for "Property Dam-
age" in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Cases, 72 VA. L REV. 943, 943 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Acme Galvanizing Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 405,
406 (Ct. App. 1990) (insurer sought to deny coverage for damage caused by molten
zinc leaking on equipment on basis that damage was caused by a latent defect);
Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339 (9th Cir. 1989) (insurer
sought to deny coverage for latent soil erosion damage to building); Independent
Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334, 1342 (D.D.C.
1986), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1777 (1992) (claimant alleged "delayed manifestation"
of period between contamination and discovery of contamination).
14. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1544 (1lth
Cir. 1985) (insurer seeking to deny coverage of disease not manifesting itself in poli-
cy period).
15. Gail B. Agrawal, Comment, Asbestosis: Who Will Pay the Plaintiff?, 57 TUL. L.
REV. 1491, 1497 (1983).
16. Id. An insurer's duty to defend is broad, often encompassing unmeritorious
claims that the claimant files against the insured. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSUR-
ANCE LAW 462 (1971). The duty to indemnify exists when the insured shows "that
there was in fact an occurrence within the scope of the insuring agreements under
which the insurer agreed 'to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages.'" Id. at 462 n.2.
17. See, e.g., Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427, 430
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (finding different insurers on risk during periods of defective
subjects all insurers to open-ended liability for damages that may ap-
pear years after the policy period has expired. 8 Furthermore, many
types of damages are, undetectable while they are festering and it is
nearly impossible to determine when the harm actually occurred."
Courts have reacted to this problem with a variety of contrasting
theories. In California, for example, the courts have applied two differ-
ent approaches in resolving the conflict without commenting on incon-
sistency.' The absence of a standard approach creates uncertainty for
both the insurer and the insured. According to at least one court, the
conflicts that exist under state laws will not be resolved until the issue
is decided by the United States Supreme Court.2'
backfilling, discovery of dry rot, and festering period in between).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 81-86 for discussion of a case where nearly
two decades had passed between the policy period and a suit requesting coverage
under that policy. Another issue, not confronted in this Article, is statute of limita-
tions problems due to the amount of time that often passes between exposure to a
contaminant and the resulting disease. See Agrawal, supra note 15, at 1493. A majori-
ty of courts have sidestepped such potential statute of limitation problems through
applying a rule that a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when the plaintiff actually or
constructively becomes aware of the injury. Id. at 1493 nn.11-12.
19. See, e.g., Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622, 623-24
(Ct. App. 1992) (finding surface water damage to home accumulated for over a de-
cade before damage became observable); Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v.
American Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 1555 (D.N.J. 1985) (recognizing
asbestosis involves progressive tissue deterioration over long time period before dis-
ease manifests itself).
20. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1246
(Cal. 1990) (holding that "inception of loss" was the point in time when "appreciable"
damage occurs and a reasonable insured would have notice); Montrose Chem. Corp.
v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 369 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that exposure
and "continuing injury" triggers coverage); Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 3
Cal. Rptr. 2d 622, 626 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that "inception of loss" is point in
time when reasonable insured is on notice of loss); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431, 435 (Ct. App. 1990) (applying the "delayed
discovery" rule); Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 282 (Ct.
App. 1988) (same); Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 44
(Ct. App. 1962) (holding that the "inevitability" of an event does not preclude cover-
age under policy).
21. ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 576 F. Supp. 936, 943 (E.D. Pa.
1983), affd in part, rev'd in part, 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1985). Because there is no
federal trigger-of-coverage statute, federal courts deciding such cases must look to the
applicable state jurisprudence and other circuit cases that interpret the state law in
question. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 n.10
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (noting an absence of applicable
state decisions in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Connecticut); ACandS, 764 F.2d at
971 (holding Pennsylvania law was applicable to the trigger issue). One court won-
dered whether resolution of the issue would ever come before the Supreme Court
because of the Court's "policy against reviewing rulings of [Courts of] Appeals that
purport to be based on state law." Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. American
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This Article attempts to resolve the courts' dilemma of deciding how
to determine when coverage is triggered, when faced with conflicting
caselaw and divergent theories. Section II discusses how courts have
construed the relevant provisions under Comprehensive General Liabili-
ty policies as well as how they have interpreted certain terms within
contracts of insurance.' Section III defines and explores the main the-
ories applied when courts are confronted with the question of when
policy coverage is triggered. These theories are the exposure theory,'
the manifestation of loss theory,' the injury-in-fact theory' and the
continuous trigger theory.26 Finally, Section IV examines the adverse
impact caused by the application of divergent theories, and advocates a
universal approach to policy coverage.27
1U. COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY COVERAGE
A. Pertinent Comprehensive General Liability Coverage Provisions
In resolving questions of insurance coverage, one should first focus
Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 1551 n.3 (D.N.J. 1985). The Supreme Court
confronted the trigger-of-coverage issue, at least by implication, in Urie v. Thompson,
337 U.S. 163 (1949). In Urie, the Court considered whether a cause of action for
silicosis accrued during exposure to silicosis or manifestation of the disease for stat-
ute of limitation purposes. Id. at 169. In holding that the manifestation of the disease
was the significant period for statute of limitation purposes, the Court concluded that
a contrary construction would impose upon the plaintiff a duty "to diagnose . . . a
disease whose symptoms had not yet obtruded on his consciousness." Id.
22. See infra notes 28-97 and accompanying text. One district court described the
Comprehensive General Liability policy as:
[A] standard liability insurance policy that, with only rare exception, is rou-
tinely used by the insurance industry in the United States. Under this policy
an insurer must indemnify the insured for "all sums which the insured shall
be legally obliged to pay as damages because of ... bodily injury...
caused by an occurrence." The insurer is additionally obligated to defend any
suit against the insured to recover damages "on account of such injury ...
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent.
Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted).
23. See infra notes 98-137 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 138-70 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 182-223 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 224-54 and accompanying text.
on the specific policy provisions involved.' Most disputes centered
around Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policies involve one of
two versions of the CGL policy: a standardized version drafted in 1966
or a standardized version drafted in 1973.' Both versions obligate the
insurer to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages" because of bodily
injury or property damage caused by an occurrence.'
The major differences between the two standardized types of CGL
policies is how each type defines the term "occurrence."" "Occur-
28. See, e.g., Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 124 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (interpreting the proper meaning of the policy term "occurrence" in order to
determine what events will trigger insurers' duty to defend); Hancock Labs., Inc. v.
Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1985) (analyzing trigger-of-coverage issue
by construing policy terms "bodily injury" and "occurrence"); Insurance Co. of N. Am.
v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1217 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1109 (1981) (analyzing trigger-of-coverage issue by construing policy term "bodily
injury"); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (analyzing trigger-of-coverage issue by construing policy terms "suit" and "dam-
ages"); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 483 A.2d
402, 405 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the starting point in evaluating a claim is the poli-
cy itself).
29. Arness & Eliason, supra note 12, at 946. The CGL policy was first introduced
in 1940 and underwent substantial changes in 1943, 1955, 1966, and 1973. Id.
"Liability Insurance" is defined as a "[clontract by which one party promises on
consideration to compensate or reimburse other if he shall suffer loss from specified
cause or to guaranty or indemnify or secure him against loss from that cause."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 915 (6th ed. 1990); see also Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Ca-
sualty Co., 770 P.2d 704, 705 n.2 (Cal. 1989) (distinguishing liability insurance, which
serves to protect an insured against third parties who claim injury, from first-party
insurance, which protects the insured against loss or damage).
30. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir.
1985). In Sepco Corp., the court held that exposure to loss-creating agents constitutes
an occurrence for purposes of coverage. Id. at 1546.
Generally, where a single event or process results in damages or injuries, it is
considered one occurrence even though the losses are spread over a long period of
time or among a great number of people. See, e.g., Barrett v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins.
Co., 264 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding that the breaking of several windows
while house was being worked on constituted one occurrence); Saint Paul-Mercury
Indem. Co. v. Rutland, 225 F.2d 689, 704 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding that train derailment
which caused damage to sixteen train cars constituted one occurrence); Union Car-
bide Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 399 F. Supp. 12, 21 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that
defective chemical that caused injury to many users constituted a single occurrence);
Southern Intl. Corp. v. Poly-Urethane Indus., Inc., 353 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (holding that contractor damaging several condominiums when applying a
sealant constituted a single occurrence).
31. Prior to the revision of the CGL in 1966, the use of the term "accident" as op-
posed to "occurrence" in liability policies greatly confused the courts. American Mo-
torists Ins. v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 406 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (1978). Specifically, there
was confusion as to whether "accident" referred to the act or the resulting injury. Id.
[Vol. 21: 813, 1994] Continuous Trigger
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rence" in the 1966 CGL policy refers to "an accident, including injurious
conditions which results during the policy period, in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of
the insured."' In contrast, "occurrence" in the 1973 CGL policy is de-
fined typically as "an accident, including continuous or repeated expo-
sure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.'
The 1973 version is more encompassing because even events that are
not sudden may trigger a policy's coverage.
34
In response to this confusion, the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the
Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau replaced the word "accident" with the word "occur-
rence"-a change that insurance commentators at the time interpreted to refer to the
injury and not the time of the accident or exposure. Id. However, not all courts con-
strue the term "accident" in pre-1966 policies to necessarily exclude coverage for
long-term contamination losses. See Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1147 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding "accident" to include
long-term contamination of soil and water).
32. Arness & Eliason, supra note 12, at 946. Whether an insured expected or in-
tended a loss is often at issue when a court decides whether coverage exists under
various types of insurance policies. See Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426
A.2d 888, 891 (Me. 1981) (holding insured's aggravated assault of claimant was not
expected or intended); Nielsen v. St. Paul Cos., 583 P.2d 545, 546-47 (Or. 1978) (hold-
ing "expected or intended" refers to injury not act); Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co.
v. Phalen, 597 P.2d 720, 724 (Mont. 1979) (same); Altena v. United Fire & Casualty
Co., 422 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Iowa 1988) (holding insured's rape of cousin was intention-
al and not covered under policy); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834,
835 (Minn. 1982) (holding that the sexual assault was expected and intended and
therefore not covered under the policy); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Muth, 207
N.W.2d 364, 366-67 (Neb. 1973) (holding that insured who purposely fired B-B gun
but accidentally injured claimant did not expect or intend loss).
33. Arness & Eliason, supra note 12, at 946 (emphasis in original); Independent
Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334, 1340 (D.D.C.
1986) (holding that CGL occurrence for bodily injury purposes triggered at time re-
leased contaminants actually caused diagnosable medical injury), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1777 (1992). Cf. Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427, 429
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (defining occurrence as "continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same continuous conditions").
34. Arness & Eliason, supra note 12, at 947. The Third Circuit stated that the test
for determining an occurrence was whether there exists "one proximate, uninter-
rupted, and continuing cause" that created all the losses. Appalachian Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982) (interpreting policy language)
(quoting Bartholomew v. Inc. Co. N. Am., 502 F. Supp. 246, 251 (D.R.I. 1980), offd
sub nom., Bartholomew v. Appalachian Inc. Co., 655 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1981)); but see
Elston-Richards Storage Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 194 F. Supp. 673, 678-82
(W.D. Mich. 1960) (holding that each separate incident of damage constitutes a sepa-
Another difference between the 1966 and 1973 CGL policies involves
the definition of property damage. Prior to the 1973 revision, some
courts held that property damage includes intangible losses to property
such as loss of use or diminution of value.' The drafters of the 1973
revision added the modifier, "physical" injury to property damage so
that policies would no longer cover intangible losses.' An example of
the effect of this revision exists in Hamilton Die Cast, Inc. v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 7, where a manufacturer of tennis
rackets attempted to obtain indemnification from its insurer for the
cost of defective frames.' The court denied the claim, holding that the
"mere inclusion" of a defective part did not constitute property damage
where other parts were not physically harmed.' As a result, the in-
sured must show that some tangible physical injury took place to trig-
ger coverage under a CGL policy."
Although drafters have revised CGL policies several times over a
period of many years, the policies are treated the same for purposes of
analyzing coverage.4' Therefore, the threshold issue of when the policy
regards the plaintiff as injured for purposes of coverage remains the
rate occurrence), offd, 291 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1961).
35. See, e.g., McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co.,
711 F.2d 521, 525-26 n.7 (3d Cir. 1983)(citations omitted); Hasenstein v. Saint Paul-
Mercury Indem. Co., 65 N.W.2d 122, 124-26 (Minn. 1954).
36. Sde Laurie Vasichek, Liability Coverage for "Damages Because of Property
Damage" Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 68 MINN. L. REV. 795,
800-13 (1984); George H. Tinker, Comprehensive General Liability Insur-
ance-Perspective and Overview, 25 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 217, 224-26 (1975).
37. 508 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1975).
38. Id. at 419-20.
39. Id. See, e.g., Liberty Bank of Mont. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 870 F.2d 1504,
1509 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that economic losses, such as lost profit or good will,
are intangible property damage and not covered under CGL policy); Sting Sec., Inc. v.
First Mercury Syndicate, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 555, 561 (D. Md. 1992) (holding that lost
profits are intangible property damages and not covered under CGL policy); Wyoming
Sawmills v. Transportation Ins. Co., 578 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Or. 1978) (holding that dimi-
nution in property value is intangible property damage and not covered under CGL
policy). Cf. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Munroe, 527 P.2d 64, 68 (Mont. 1974) (holding that
physical damage to wheat justified coverage under CGL policy).
40. American Home Assurance Co. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22, 25 (1st
Cir. 1986) (holding that CGL policy of window manufacturer covered consequential
losses stemming from physical injury to windows). Generally, the risk of replacing
and repairing defective materials is not covered by a liability insurer. Stewart
Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812, 825-26
(1961); but see Hauenstein v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 65 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Minn.
1954) (finding coverage where defective plaster had to be removed from walls).
41. Barbara Wrubel, Liability Insurance for Insidious Diseases: Who Picks Up the
Tab?, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 657, 666-67 (1980).
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same.
42 In addition to the variations in CGL policies, the insured's
rights and obligations may also depend on the manner in which the
court construes the applicable policy language.43
B. Relevant Principles of Construction Affecting CGL Policies
After figuring out the pertinent policy provisions at issue, a court
must consider certain principles of construction that affect the interpre-
tation of CGL policies.' A proper analysis should include a close ex-
amination of the language of the policy in determining how coverage is
triggered. For example, one commentator noted that depending on
whether a court employed the exposure or the manifestation theory, the
court may be forced to construe the policy so that additional terms are
added in order to justify applying either theory.45
Generally, however, insurance contracts are subject to the same con-
struction as the courts afford to other contracts.' For example, courts
42. Id. at 668.
43. See, e.g., Honeycomb Sys., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp. 1400, 1405-06
(D. Me. 1983) (holding turned on construction of term "occurrence"); Gassaway v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 439 S.W.2d 605, 608-09 (Tenn. 1969) (holding turned on con-
struction of phrase "expected by the insured"); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding turned on construction
of term "damages"); Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 761 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding turned on construction of term "suit").
44. See, e.g., Ray Indus., 974 F.2d at 759 (holding that court must first determine
whether policy is ambiguous when construing policy coverage); Powers v. Detroit
Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 398 N.W.2d 411, 420 (Mich. 1986) (holding that court must
decide which interpretation of policy should apply); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d
168, 171 (Cal. 1966) (holding that courts must ascertain a policy's meaning according
to the insured's reasonable expectations); see also Rohner v. Niemann, 380 A.2d 549,
552 (Del. 1977) (holding that construction of an insurance contract is a question of
law); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 970 F.2d 1267, 1269 (3d
Cir. 1992) (holding that court possesses plenary review over "correct construction" of
policy), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1846 (1993).
45. Wrubel, supra note 41, at 677. However, one commentator argues that the
courts' application of principles of construction to the trigger-of-coverage issue has
created, rather than resolved, the inconsistent judicial resolutions to the issue. Adju-
dicating Asbestos Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 739,
740 (1984) (hereafter "Adjudicating Liability").
46. Martin v. Phillips, 356 So. 2d 1016, 1018 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (holding principles
of contract construction apply to insurance contracts); Robichaux v. Group. Hosp.
Serv. Inc., 379 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (determining identical proposi-
tion); Hocker v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1991) (deter-
mining identical proposition); Enterprise Tools Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 799 F.2d
interpret insurance contracts in their entirety, as opposed to interpret-
ing isolated provisions." As with other contracts, courts also examine
the objectives of the respective parties-the insurer and the in-
sured-when construing policy coverage." Finally, as with other con-
tracts, absent conflicts with statutes or public policy, courts presume
that insurance contracts encompass the parties' "entire and final" agree-
ment.49
Because of this presumption, a court interpreting an insurance policy
may not expand or contract the scope of coverage beyond the contem-
plation of the contract parties. ° Notwithstanding the courts' reluctance
to extend coverage, several factors bearing specifically on interpretation
of insurance contracts merit closer examination. What follows are six
principles of construction that directly affect the ultimate resolution of
what triggers coverage under a given CGL policy.
1. Ambiguous Terms are Construed in Favor of Coverage
After determining that certain policy terms are ambiguous, courts
apply a principle of construction that goes beyond the literal words of
the policies themselves." When policy language is clear, the plain
meaning of the policy terms controls, but when the terms are ambigu-
ous the policy is interpreted in the insured's favor.' The purpose of
437, 439 (8th Cir. 1986) (determining identical proposition), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931
(1987).
47. See, e.g., Fresard v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 327 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Mich.
1982) (holding that "meaning should be given to all terms"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Free-
man, 443 N.W.2d 734, 749 (Mich. 1989) (holding that full effect should be given to all
words within a policy). Cf. Shadbolt v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 551 P.2d 478, 480 (Or.
1976) (interpreting provisions in context of entire agreement); Prowant v. Sealy, 187
P. 235, 239 (Okla. 1919) (holding courts must gather the parties intentions from the
context of the entire agreement).
48. Wrubel, supra note 41, at 674-75.
49. Id. at 675.
50. See. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955).
Accord Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. Inc., 842
F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988) (adopting identical rule); Ladd Constr. Co. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 391 N.E.2d 568, 571 (Il. App. Ct. 1979) (adopting identical rule).
51. Vargas v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that
insured was covered because terms were capable of more than one "reasonable and
fair interpretation"). But see Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning
the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988). The principle is also referred
to as "contra preferentem" which is defined as "against the party who proffers or
puts forward a thing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 327 (6th ed. 1990); see also Mazzilli v.
Accident & Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, 170 A.2d 800, 803 (N.J. 1961) (illustrating
principle).
52. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir.
1982) (holding that theory of coverage justified by ambiguity of "occurrence"); Filor,
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this construction is to fulfill the policy's fundamental purpose of cover-
ing the insured for a loss.' Sometimes parties assert that CGL policy
definitions are themselves ambiguous. For example, one defendant
argued that since "bodily injury" was simply defined as "bodily injury"
in the policy definitions, the term was more of a "chant" than a defi-
nition and therefore represented an ambiguity.' The court should ap-
ply a strict construction against the insurer and a more liberal construc-
tion as to the insured to determine if an ambiguity exists.' A similar
approach was adopted in Cohen v. North American Life & Casualty
Co.,' in which the court was confronted with the proper interpretation
of a policy providing for "disability caused solely by disease."57 The
insured's disease did not become apparent until after the period of
policy coverage, although the cause of the disease existed prior to the
Bullard & Smyth v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 605 F.2d 598, 602 (2d Cir. 1978) (insur-
er must prove desired construction of terms is "only construction which may fairly
be placed on them"); Sincoff v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 183 N.E.2d 899, 901 (N.Y.
1962)(insurer must show insured's interpretation of terms is unreasonable). Because
most words are subject to more than one interpretation, a court should look to see
whether the term in dispute is ambiguous under a "common-sense" approach rather
than a "hypertechnical" approach. New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 970 F.2d 1267, 1270 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 2 COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D,
§ 15:17 at 177-78, 190 (rev. ed. 1984).
53. Wrubel, supra note 41, at 679. The only time that a court will construe a poli-
cy provision in favor of the insurer is when the construction is the only one the
court can reasonably give to the terms. Cantanucci v. Reliance Ins. Co., 349 N.Y.S.2d
187, 191 (1973), offd, 324 N.E.2d 360 (1974).
54. Brief for Defendant/Appellee-Cross Appellant Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., at 50,
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., Nos. 78-1322 to 1326 (6th
Cir., filed July 21, 1978). Another example of how ambiguities consistently surface in
the insurance context is exemplified by the varying interpretations of the word "sud-
den" in pollution exclusions of policies. In Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
676 F. Supp. 1571, 1573 (S.D. Ga. 1987), the district court interpreted "sudden" in pol-
lution exclusions as tantamount to "abruptness." However, in Jackson Township Mun.
Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 994 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1982), the New Jersey Superior Court interpreted "sudden" in pollution exclusions to
mean that "the permeation of pollution into the ground water may have been gradual
rather than sudden."
55. 12 J. APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 7401, at 197 (rev.
ed. 1976).
56. 185 N.W. 939 (Minn. 1921).
57. Id. at 939. In addition, the policy provideal indemnification for a disability
"solely as the result of disease which shall originate and begin after this policy shall
have been in continuous force for 30 days." Id.
period of policy coverage.' In holding that the insurer was liable, the
court noted that the rule of interpretation "is the usual one .... [Ilt
must be favorable to the insured." '
2. Policy Terms are Strictly Construed Against Commercial Entities
Courts are confronted with a presumption in favor of coverage if the
conflict is not readily resolved by the policy's terms.' However, some
jurisdictions counter this presumption by strictly construing policy
terms where the insured party is a commercial entity.' This construc-
tion may be particularly important in resolving trigger-of-coverage ques-
tions because commercial entities such as asbestos installers,' con-
struction companies,' and insulation manufacturers' are frequently
the insured parties in such cases.
One of the reasons that courts construe ambiguous terms against
insurers is because most policyholders lack the same resources, bar-
gaining strength, and information as insurance companies.' However,
the fact that large commercial entities that purchase insurance often
possess "risk management divisions" possessing "sophistication [rival-
ing] that of the insurance companies themselves" justifies applying a
strict construction to those entities.'
58. Id.
59. Id. The court held that the insured was not concerned with the "remote cause
of the disease." Id.
60. Another court defined the principle of construction in a different way, stating
that the policy should be understood as "a layman would read it" as opposed to an
attorney or expert on insurance. Crane v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 485 P.2d
1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971) (holding that medical expenses for child injured at home while
mother was working covered under homeowner's policy despite "business pursuits"
exclusion in policy).61. See, e.g., Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d
563, 566 (Pa. 1983). The court in Standard Venetian Blind rejected the use of this
construction in the case before it, holding that provisions excluding coverage are
.plain and free from -ambiguity" and declined to "rewrite the parties' written con-
tract." Id.; Eastern Associated Coal v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068 (3d
Cir. 1980) (holding that equality in bargaining power between the contracting parties
justifies a strict construction against commercial entities).
62. See, e.g., ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir.
1985)(asbestos installation).
63. See, e.g., American Home Assurance v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22
(1st Cir. 1986)(window installation subcontractor).
64. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., v. PPG Indus., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 290
(1983)(foam insulation).
65. K. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION, 28 (1990) (general discussion and
cases on how standard policies are drafted by insurance companies construing ambig-
uous language).
66. Arness & Eliason, supra note 12, at 950. On the other hand, the New Jersey
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3. The Reasonable Expectations of the Insured Should be Honored
A maxim central to the interpretation of insurance contracts states
that the reasonable expectations of the insured when purchasing an
insurance policy should be enforced even if "painstaking study" of the
policy's terms would have revealed that the insured's expectations were
unreasonable.67 The policy rationale of the reasonable expectations
construction is that although the insured should ideally read the entire
policy, in reality "only a hearty soul would... plow[] through all the
fine print."' In Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co.,' the
court applied the reasonable expectations principle to an insured whose
dormant Parkinson's disease was reactivated after a piece of lumber hit
him on the head."
district court expressly rejected the theory that the commercial entity construction
cancels out the ambiguity construction. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1154 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that ambiguity of
term "accidental" justified construction in favor of insured despite fact that insured
was commercial entity). One reason why the commercial entity construction does not
cancel out the ambiguity construction may be because most commercial entities do
not have a part in negotiating or drafting the eventual insurance agreement. New
Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1189 (3d Cir.
1991) (noting that insurers usually draft policy language without the input from or
negotiation with the insured). Therefore, an ambiguous term should not be construed
in favor of the insured where the insured is a commercial entity which actively nego-
tiated the actual terms of the insurance policy. In such cases, the court would be
safe in presuming that a commercial entity, with considerable resources for consul-
tation, knew and expected the ramifications of the iolicy terms.
67. KEETON, supra note 16, at 351. Some of the early reasonable-expectations cases
involved situations where the insured did not have the ability to solicit the meanings
of the policy terms from the insurer. See, e.g., Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 118
N.E.2d 555, 558 (N.Y. 1954) (applying principle to flight insurance); Steven v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 377 P.2d 284, 288 (Cal. 1962) (same); Klos v. Mobile Oil Co., 259
A.2d 889, 894 (N.J. 1969) (applying principle to life insurance solicitation by mail);
see also William Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a Principled Application,
13 PEPP. L. REV. 267 (1986) (providing a comprehensive review of the reasonable
expectations doctrine).
68. Another view of the reasonable-expectations doctrine is that it is merely an ex-
tension of the principle that ambiguities are construed against the insured. ABRAHAM,
supra note 65, at 42. One authority on insurance law noted that traditionally "ambi-
guities . .. [are] resolved favorably to the insured's claim only if a reasonable person
in his position would have expected coverage." KEETON, supra note 16, at 352. Cf.
Herzog v. National Am. Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 841, 843 (Cal. 1970) (holding that coverage
for motor bike injury under homeowner's liability provision was unreasonable).
69. 170 A.2d 22 (N.J. 1961).
70. Id. at 24. Despite the reasonable-expectations doctrine, it is still the burden of
The Kievit court held that the insured was covered despite his
pre-existing condition, explaining that when the public purchases insur-
ance, they are entitled a broad degree of protection in accordance with
their reasonable expectations.' The reasonable expectations principle
applies in both decisions interpreting coverage clauses and decisions
that decide the manner in which they are triggered.'
4. Policy Terms are Interpreted to Possess their Plain Meaning
A fourth principle of construction impacting CGL policy coverage is
the notion that when a court interprets insurance terms, the court
should interpret the provision according to the normal and typical
meaning of the terms in dispute.' Some courts employ the "plain
meaning" rule from the viewpoint of the ordinary or reasonable per-
son.7' Other courts interpret the plain meaning rule to employ the van-
tage point of the insured in the particular case.
75
However, the plain meaning of a policy term is susceptible to several
outside influences. For example, when parties admit expert testimony,
the insured, not the insurer, to establish the validity of a policy claim. Riehl v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19, 23 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting the burden in a toxic dumping
case); Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068,
1074 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981) (holding that the insured bears
the burden of establishing a claim); Mackiw v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers
Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 193 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 1963) (holding that insured failed to
meet the burden of establishing damages).
71. Kievit, 170 A.2d at 26; see also Dittmar v. Continental Casualty Co., 150 A.2d
666, 672 (N.J. 1959) (holding that disability policies should "be afforded a liberal
construction"); Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 377 P.2d 284, 288-89 (Cal. 1962)
(noting that a reasonable person would expect flight protection to cover substitute
flight); Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 A.2d 638, 644 (N.J. 1965) (explaining
that when the public buys insurance, they are entitled to a "broad measure of protec-
tion").
72. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253 (1990) (holding that
coverage clauses are interpreted to protect an insured's reasonable expectations);
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 366-67 (Ct. App. 1992)
(explaining that insured reasonably expected coverage for continuous and progressive
damages).
73. 13 J. APPLEhtN, supra note 55, § 7384 at 71.
74. See, e.g., Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co. v. La Chance, 343 A.2d 642, 643 (N.H. 1975)
(policy should be interpreted in light of the "ordinarily intelligent insured"); Magulas
v. Travelers Ins. Co, 327 A.2d 608, 609 (N.H. 1974) (stating that the reasonable expec-
tations of the insured should be honored).
75. See, e.g., Shields v. Hiram C. Gardner, Inc., 444 P.2d 38, 43 (Idaho 1968) (not-
ing that construction must comport with what the insured party is likely to contem-
plate); Rayert v. Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 106 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Idaho 1940) (explain-
ing that a policy must be given liberal construction to comport with insured's under-
standing).
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the average juror may differ regarding the reasonable interpretation of a
policy term.'6 Furthermore, a court may take into consideration extrin-
sic evidence on the meaning of a policy term. For example, the First
Circuit advised district judges that they would be "well advised" to
admit all extrinsic evidence on the meaning of a policy term unless
such evidence is privileged, takes too much time, or is otherwise inad-
missible. 7
Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.' offers a classic ex-
ample of the effect of the plain meaning rule. In Silverstein, the court
faced the issue of whether a dormant ulcer was sufficient to trigger
coverage under a policy providing coverage for "disease" or "infirmi-
ty."' Judge Cardozo, writing the opinion for the court, interpreted the
policy definition from the vantage point of the "ordinary businessman"
and determined that a completely dormant infirmity did not trigger
policy coverage until it manifested itself.'
5. Ownership During the Policy Period is Not Required
Another issue of construction directly affecting CGL policy coverage
involves whether the claimant suing the insured must have, in fact,
owned the damaged property during the policy period for CGL coverage
to exist. The court in Garriott Crop Dusting Co. v. Superior Court"
directly confronted this issue. In Garriott, the insured, a crop duster,
purchased CGL policies spanning the period from 1967 to 1970, during
which time the insured's caused, the toxic contamination of adjacent
properties."' The City of Bakersfield purchased one of the contaminat-
ed properties in 1985 and subsequently sued Garriott. Garriott's insur-
76. 3 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 542 (1960); 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 629 (3d ed. 1961).
77. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 682 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983).
78. 171 N.E. 914 (N.Y. 1930).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 915. The court remarked, "[a]n ulcer as trivial and benign as an unin-
fected pimple is at most a tendency to an infirmity and not an infirmity itself." Id.
81. 270 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Ct. App. 1990).
82. Id. at 680.
83. Id. at 679. The insurer based its argument on the holding of the court in
Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 295 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956), an application
the Garriott court rejected. Garriott, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 685. In Remmer, the court
held that the time of an occurrence under a CGL policy is the time of actual dam-
age. Remmer, 295 P.2d at 21. The Garriott court, however, limited the general rule
er denied coverage, asserting that there was no obligation because the
City did not purchase the contaminated property until fifteen years
after the policies issued by them had expired.'
The Garriott court rejected the insurer's argument that the claimant
must be the owner of the property during the policy period. Instead, the
court construed CGL coverage such that when an insured is sued for
property damage occurring during the policy period, CGL coverage is
triggered.' A contrary holding, the court indicated, would violate "ev-
ery fundamental rule" of insurance interpretation.
6. Only Contingent Losses May be Insured
Finally, a basic principle of insurance law construction is that "an
insurer cannot insure against a loss that is known or apparent to the
insured."87 In fact, this principle, known as the "loss-in-progress
rule,"'M is so prevalent that many states specifically codify it.' The
loss-in-progress rule is premised on the fact that if a court forces an
insurer to cover a loss that is known to the insured prior to the policy,
the court forces the insurer to become a guarantor of a property's quali-
of Remmer, holding that the rule does not apply when the act causing the damage
and the damage itself occur during the same policy period. Garriott, 270 Cal. Rptr. at
685. To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would be to create a "prerequisite to
coverage" not contained in the policies themselves. Id.
84. Garriott, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1238, 1230 n.7 (Cal.
1990); see also Bartholomew v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27, 28-29 (1st Cir.
1981) (holding that insurance may only cover contingent risks); Kenneth S. Abraham,
Environmental Liability and Limits of Insurance, 88 COLtm. L. REV. 942, 953 (1988)
(discussing the fundamental proposition of insurance law that fortuitous losses are a
prerequisite to coverage).
88. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281-82 (Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that coverage may be provided only for non-contingent loss). See RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 291 cmt. a. (1932). The Restatement defines a "fortuitous
event" as an "event . . .dependent on chance . . .beyond the power of human be-
ings; it may be within the control of third parties . . .provided the fact is known to
the parties."; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 399 cmt. a (1981). The Second
Restatement of Contracts defined an "aleatory contract" as a contract "dependent on
chance (or dependent on a] fact unknown to the parties." Id.
89. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 250 (West 1972) (limiting insurance to "any contin-
gent or unknown event"); N.Y. INS. LAw § 1101(a) (McKinney 1985) (insurance must
be "dependent upon . . .a fortuitous event"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 2 (1957) (in-
surance coverage hinges on "determinable contingencies"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:5(1)(a) (West 1959 & Supp. 1991) (similar wording); WYO. STAT. § 26-1-102 (1977)
(defining insurance contract to cover "fortuitous occurrences" and "ascertainable risk
contingencies").
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ty, a responsibility not within the contemplation of the insurance con-
tract.' On the other hand, if a loss pre-exists the policy, coverage may
nevertheless be found if neither the insurer nor the insured possessed
actual or constructive knowledge of the loss.'
Insurers often employ the contingent losses principle in cases of
continuous and progressive property damage by arguing that certain
losses were inevitable at the onset of the policy and therefore are not
covered.' In Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,' for example,
the insurer argued that because the instability of a landfill prior to the
policy made later earth movement unavoidable, the ensuing damage
was not insurable. 4 The court in Snapp, however, rejected the
insurer's argument and held that even though the loss might, in fact,
90. Greene v. Cheetham, 293 F.2d 933, 937 (2d Cir. 1961). See also Intermetal
Mexicana, S.A. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 866 F.2d 71, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding
that taking of equipment under court order was not a fortuitous event); Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 678 F. Supp. 138, 141, 14243 (W.D. Va.
1988) (holding that collapse of ground was fortuitous regardless of insured's knowl-
edge of mining in the area); Mellon v. Federal Ins. Co., 14 F.2d 997, 1000-02 (S.D.N.Y.
1929) (holding that explosion was not fortuitous because deliberate); Employers Casu-
alty Co. v. Holm, 393 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (holding water damage
to be fortuitous where neither party contemplated loss).
91. For example, in Burch v. Commonwealth County Mut. Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 838
(Tex. 1970), the Texas Supreme Court allowed coverage under an automobile policy
for a collision that occurred on the first day of the stipulated policy period, even
though the accident occurred one day before actual issuance by the insurer's agent.
In adopting the majority rule, the supreme court held that so long as neither insurer
nor insured knew of the loss when they entered into the insurance contract, a court
could grant recovery under the policy. Id. at 83940. See generally 43 A. JUR. 2d In-
surance § 1057 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Atlantic Lines v. American Motorists Ins., 547 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir.
1976) (holding that insured must demonstrate that loss was fortuitous under policy);
Kilroy Indus. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 847, 857 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding
that nonfortuitous losses are not coverable); Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superi-
or Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1246-47 (Cal. 1990) (insurer argued that it was not account-
able for loss because loss was continuous and progressive over several policy peri-
ods); Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 897 (Cal. 1963) (insurer disputes coverage to
insured because loss was not fortuitous where house was built on uncompacted fill);
Advance Micro Devices, Inc. v. Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 245 Cal. Rptr. 44,
50 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding no coverage due to insured's knowledge of preexisting
conditions); Avis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 195 S.E.2d 545, 547 (N.C. 1973) (stating
that only losses of a fortuitous nature fall under coverage).
93. 24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Ct. App. 1962). See infra notes 14346 and accompanying text
for a more extensive discussion of Snapp.
94. Id. at 45.
have been inevitable at the time of formation of the contract, there was
no guarantee that the loss would occur during the policy.'
Notwithstanding their usefulness, the principles discussed above do
not dispositively decide issues of coverage. Rather, the facts and policy
considerations presented by each case unavoidably impact the interpre-
tation of policy terms.' Even after considering the applicable policy
provisions, the relevant interpretive principles and the particular facts
of the case, the insured is still faced with the fundamental problem of
defining what triggers coverage under his or her policy." The following
section examines the theories used by the courts in resolving the
trigger-of-coverage issue.
III. THE TRIGGER-OF-COVERAGE THEORIES: EXPOSURE, MANIFESTATION
OF LOSS, INJURY-IN-FACT, AND CONTINUOUS TRIGGER
After considering the specific provisions of CGL policies and the
maxims of construction that affect the interpretation of such provi-
sions, courts still arrive at different theories of how coverage is trig-
gered under CGL policies. Specifically, courts have propounded four
possible solutions to the trigger of coverage question: the exposure
theory,' the manifestation of loss theory,' the injury-in-fact theory'"
and the continuous trigger theory."'
95. Id. at 45-46.
96. Independent Petrochemicals Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp.
1334, 1337 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that "policy considerations and medical facts of
each case" impact the court's resolution of coverage issues), aofd in part, rev'd in
part, 944 F.2d 940 (1991). Mitchell L. Lathrop noted that the scope of coverage of a
particular insurance policy is determined "from the facts of the particular claim" as
well as the policy's terms. Lathrop, supra note 2, § 32.08
97. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). The Keene court noted that in analyzing the duty
of the insurer to the insured, there are three basic steps: ascertaining the trigger of
coverage, deciding the extent of coverage, and allocating the coverage among insurers
where two or more policies are triggered. Id. This Article is concerned primarily with
the trigger theory issue and the allocation issue to the extent that the trigger-of-cov-
erage impacts them.
98. See infra notes 102-37 and accompanying text for discussion on the exposure
theory.
99. See infra notes 138-70 and accompanying text for discussion on the manifesta-
tion of loss theory.
100. See infra notes 171-81 and accompanying text for discussion on the injury-in-
fact theory.
101. See infra notes 182-223 and accompanying text for discussion on the continu-
ous trigger theory.
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A. Exposure Theory of Triggering Coverage
Under the exposure theory of triggering coverage, exposure to the
agent that eventually produces the loss, such as inhalation of asbestos
dust, triggers the policy." Therefore, the exposure theory is, in effect,
a "continuing tort," making all insurers liable during the periods of ex-
posure."° An insured who is successfully sued in a jurisdiction apply-
ing the exposure trigger of loss theory is entitled to indemnification by
the policy in effect during the period where the claimant came into con-
tact with the injurious condition."° Courts have applied the exposure
trigger-of-coverage theory in scenarios involving bodily injury" as well
as situations dealing with property damage."°
1. The Exposure Theory in the Bodily Injury Context
a. Asbestos inhalation injuries
The courts first confronted the trigger-of-coverage quandary in the
context of bodily injury caused by asbestos, typically involving claim-
ants who inhaled asbestos fibers in the workplace and years later devel-
oped asbestosis. 10 7 The Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits all
102. Agrawal, supra note 15, at 1506. In fact, injury caused by inhalation of asbes-
tos is one of the most common contexts in which courts confront the trigger-of-cov-
erage theory. See, e.g., ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973
(3d Cir. 1985) (continuous trigger applied to asbestosis); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins., 682 F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1982) (manifestation theory applied to asbestosis),
cert. denied, sub nom., Froude v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 460 U.S. 1028 (1983); Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1334, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (continuous
trigger theory applied to asbestosis), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Insurance Co.
of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1221 (6th Cir. 1980) (expo-
sure theory applied to asbestosis), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
103. Earnest, supra note 9, at 67. In the area of workers' compensation policies, a
topic not discussed in this Article, coverage is generally predicated upon when the
last exposure occurred. G.Z. NOTHSTEIN, Toxic TORTS-LITGATION OF HAZARDOUS SUB-
STANCE CASES 361 (Ist ed. 1984); see also Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Aetna Life
& Casualty, 483 A.2d 402, 410 (N.J. 1984) (holding that exposure theory mandates
coverage only where exposure results in injury).
104. Terry A.H. Senne, Insurance Law-Products Liability Insurance-Time of
Exposure Triggers Coverage for Asbestos Related Disease, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1127,
1128 n.7 (1980).
105. See infra notes 107-31 and accompanying text for discussion on the exposure
theory applied in the context of bodily injury claims.
106. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text for discussion on the exposure
theory in the context of property damage claims.
107. R. Kennedy, Primary, Excess and Reinsurer Disputes, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND
have sporadically applied the exposure theory of triggering coverage,
holding that the occurrence of "the first physiological, cellular damage"
triggers liability, even if the disease does not manifest itself until a later
date. 1 8
For instance, in Insurance Company of North America v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,"° the decision of whether to adopt the
exposure theory or another theory confronted the court.11 Forty-Eight
Insulations manufactured asbestos from 1955 to 1970 and was insured
under CGL policies of five different insurers: the Insurance Company of
North America ("INA") from 1955 to 1972; Affiliated FM Insurance ("Af-
filiated FM") from 1972 to 1975; Illinois National Insurance ("Illinois
National") from 1975 to January 1976; Travelers Indemnity Company of
Rhode Island ("Travelers") from January to November 1976; and Liberty
Mutual Insurance ("Liberty") after November of 1976.1"
Numerous claimants filed suits against Forty-Eight Insulations, alleg-
ing that the manufacturer's failure to warn employees of the dangers
associated with asbestos fibers caused them bodily injury. " INA,
Affiliated FM, Illinois National, and Liberty Mutual asserted that no
coverage existed under the policies because no disease manifested itself
during their policy periods."' Forty-Eight and Travelers urged the
court that the relevant dates for triggering coverage was not when as-
Toxic TORT CLAIMS: INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1989 AND BEYOND, 346 (1989). Asbestosis
is a progressive disease that results "when fibrous lung tissue surrounds small asbes-
tos particles which have been inhaled in order to prevent the fibers from moving
around or causing irritation to neighboring cells .... [T]he encapsulation process
diminishes pulmonary function and makes breathing difficult." Louis R. FRUMER &
MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 58.04 (1992).
108. Kennedy, supra note 107, at 349. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit in dicta ob-
served that "Missouri would probably adopt the 'exposure theory' of coverage." Conti-
nental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. Inc., 842 F.2d 977, 984
(8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, sub nom., Missouri v. Continental Ins. Cos., 488 U.S. 821
(1988).
109. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1987).
110. Id. at 1216-17.
111. Id. at 1215. Another decision in which the court faced the issue of asbestos
injury was Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425,
433 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that exposure to asbestos triggered policy coverage). Cf
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1389-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding
delivery of, not exposure to, Agent Orange to soldiers in Vietnam triggers coverage).
112. Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. j (1974) (stating that "[i]n order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning on the container,
as to its use"). See also 1 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 10.3 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing failure to warn under the Uniform Commercial Code).
113. Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1216-17. These companies urged the court to follow a
manifestation theory, which held that no "bodily injury" took place until the asbes-
tosis became diagnosible. Id.
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bestosis manifested itself in the claimants but, rather, when the actual
exposure to asbestos occurred."4
The Forty-Eight court recognized that it is not economically feasible
to introduce medical testimony in each asbestosis case to determine the
precise point of onset of the disease."5 Furthermore, the court re-
jected the proposition that medical advances could be used to deter-
mine the exact point when the bodily injury occurred. In arriving at its
decision to apply an exposure trigger of coverage, the court first ac-
cepted Forty-Eight's argument that the policy terms "bodily injury" and
"occurrence" were ambiguous when applied to a cumulative and pro-
gressive disease, and therefore construed the terms in favor of the in-
sured."6 The court also reasoned that an exposure theory was war-
ranted because medical testimony showed that tissue damage occurs
immediately after asbestos inhalation, despite the fact that the disease
did not become discoverable until many years later."7
b. Non-asbestos injuries
Although the first exposure trigger cases involved exposure to asbes-
tos, courts have not confined the exposure theory in the bodily injury
context solely to asbestosis. In Clemco Industries v. Commercial Un-
ion Insurance Co., "8 the court applied the exposure rule to the dis-
114. Id. at 1217. The exposure theory "characterizes asbestosis as a series of con-
tinuing injuries to the body that accumulate to cause death or disability." For a more
detailed discussion on asbestosis and its ramifications, see Selikoff et al., Asbestosis
and Neoplasis, 42 AM. J. MED. 487 (1967); Selikoff et al., The Occurrence of Asbesto-
sis Among Insulation Workers, 132 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 139 (1965); Borel v. Fiber-
board Paper Prods., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-85 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974) (holding that asbestosis injury to workers created liability of employer).
115. Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1218. The court commented, "[W]e prefer to say that
bodily injury is bodily injury from the very beginning, rather than . . . years from ini-
tial exposure because that's when an x-ray shows it." Id. at 1217 n.10.
116. Id. at 1222.
117. Id. at 1222-23. See Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981), rehg denied, 455 U.S. 1009 (1992). In Por-
ter, the plaintiff was a worker who contracted asbestosis as the result of a filter
supplied by American Optical. Id. at 1131. Relying upon Forty-Eight, the court held
that the exposure theory was the appropriate trigger-of-coverage and observed that
the coverage should be apportioned among all of American Optical's insurers who
had policies in effect during the claimant's exposure to asbestos particles. Id. at
1145.
118. 665 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Cal. 1987), affd without opinion, 848 F.2d 1242 (9th
Cir. 1988).
ease of silicosis, stressing the similar characteristics of silicosis and
asbestosis."9 In cases involving diseases with long latency periods,
such as asbestosis and silicosis, the court stated that the exposure theo-
ry was "the only workable theory."2 '
Additionally, courts have not limited the exposure theory, as applied
in the bodily injury context, solely to the inhalation of harmful sub-
stances that cause injury. In Hancock Laboratories, Inc. v. Admiral In-
surance,2' a patient who received an implant of a bacteria-infected
heart valve sued the valve's manufacturer.'22 The Ninth Circuit adopted
the exposure theory, holding that exposure to the contaminated valve
"set in motion" the growth of the bacteria.'2 First, the court noted
that the driving force behind the construction of policy terms is the
goal of promoting coverage and that the exposure theory fulfills this
goal by allowing insurers to clearly determine their obligations." Sec-
ond, the court observed that if it adopted the manifestation theory, it
might create a shortage of coverage for injured claimants." The court
theorized that after a certain number of injuries caused by the manufac-
turer were discovered, the manufacturer would be unable to procure
adequate insurance.'26
However, not all courts have been willing to apply the exposure theo-
ry of triggering coverage to bodily injury situations. For example, in
American Motorists Insurance v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,' 7 the manufac-
turer of DES, a synthetic hormone which caused several cases of cervi-
cal cancer, urged the court to adopt the exposure theory.'28 The court
first noted that pre-1966 insurance policies covered damages covered by
an "accident," while subsequent policies covered for damages caused by
an "occurrence."'29 According to the court, CGL drafters made the
change because "great difficulty" was caused by the ambiguous nature
119. Id. at 828-29. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1941) (considering the dis-
ease of silicosis in the context of a statute of limitations issue).
120. Clemco Industries, 665 F. Supp. at 828.
121. 777 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1985).
122. Id. at 524-25. Recently, the medical field has experimented with the implemen-
tation of baboon livers into human subjects. See Man Seems to Reject Baboon Liver,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1993, (Valley ed.) at 6, col. 3.
123. Hancock, 777 F.2d at 524.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 525. The conclusion of the court proved to be somewhat extreme. Insur-
ance companies adjusted to judicial interpretations that broadened the scope of cov-
erage by creating new, more narrowly-tailored policy language. ABRAHAM, supra note
65, at 449.
127. 406 N.Y.S.2d 658 (App. Div. 1978).
128. Id. at 660.
129. Id.
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of the term "accident."'30 The court agreed with various insurance
commentators when it held that an exposure theory was inappropriate,
stating that under the policy language "results" and not "acts" determine
the correct resolution of the coverage issue. 
31
2. The Exposure Theory in the Property Damage Context
Courts have also applied the exposure theory to scenarios involving
coverage of property damage claims filed against the insured. In
Firemans Fund Insurance Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp.,'" the court deter-
mined the coverage obligations of several insurers with respect to
clean-up costs accrued from twenty-two contaminated dumping
sites." The court determined that each insurer whose policy was in
effect during the exposure period was obligated to provide a share of
coverage to the insured.'" Each insurer's obligation was proportionate
to the amount of time the insurer's policy was in effect during the peri-
od of exposure."n
130. Id. If the resolution was made so clear from merely switching the term "acci-
dent" to "occurrence," why have courts proposed as many as four different theories
of triggering coverage? See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Black, 717 F.2d 1280, 1286
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that in a worker's compensation case manifestation trigger of
coverage theory applies), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984); Commercial Union Ins.
Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that
exposure trigger of coverage theory applies); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F.
Supp. 1368, 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that delivery of the loss-causing agent
triggers coverage); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1045 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (holding that continuous trigger of coverage theory applies), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
131. American Motorists, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 660 (citing Singaas v. Diedrich, 238
N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 1976)).
132. 662 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
133. Id. at 73. An analogous issue is whether toxic clean up costs under statutes
such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA). 42 U.S.C. § 9601 constitute "damages" to the insured. See Conti-
nental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 979
(8th Cir.) (holding that CERCLA cleanup costs are not claims for damages under CGL
policies), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); Cf. New Castle County v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (D. Del. 1987) (holding that damages
include clean up costs). Generally, courts have not held that insurance coverage ex-
ists for the costs of complying with injunctions, even where the claimant could have
brought the suit for damages. Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 292
So. 2d 75, 77-78 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974); Ladd Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
391 N.E.2d 568, 570 (I1. 1979).
134. Ex-CeU-O, 662 F. Supp. at 76.
135. Ex-CeU-O, 662 F. Supp. at 76. The Ex-Cell-O court's holding is represented by
Despite the willingness of some courts to apply the exposure theory,
the theory may ultimately have a limited life span. The validity of the
exposure theory is questionable because it assumes that injury occurs
immediately upon exposure even if scientific support for that presump-
tion is lacking.' As one insurance company executive observed, it is
often impossible to "underwrite insurance based on an exposure theo-
ry .... The only serious proponents of the exposure theory are asbes-
tos manufacturers and insurers who could lose more under the manifes-
tation theory."'37 Thus, the manifestation theory is often proposed as a
viable alternative to the exposure theory.
B. Manifestation of Loss Theory of Triggering Coverage
Under the manifestation of loss theory, a claim that is discoverable or
becomes apparent under the policy period triggers coverage under a
CGL policy.'" Where a disease coming from exposure to a certain sub-
stance causes liability, the date of manifestation, and thus the trigger
for policy coverage, is determined either when the claimant has actual
or constructive knowledge of the disease, or when the disease is diag-
nosed, whichever occurs first." Policy coverage for property damage
the following formula:
% Share of
Insurer's Coverage = Time of exposure whole insurer's policy in effect
Time of exposure to contaminant
136. Wrubel, supra note 41, at 699.
137. James Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. 139, 141 (1981) (quoting Wil-
liam Bailey, chairman of the Task Force on Cumulative Trauma and Latent Injury).
Although insurers may have valid reasons to disfavor adoption of the manifestation
theory, the theory is regularly applied by all jurisdictions. See Ray Indus., Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 765 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding the manifestation
theory represents the "rule in most jurisdictions"); Honeycomb Sys., Inc. v. Admiral
Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp. 1400, 1405 (D. Me. 1983) (holding manifestation of loss is the
"general rule").
138. See generally Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance
Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 1556 (D.N.J. 1985) (explaining the manifestation theory);
Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1548 (C.D. Cal. 1992)
(holding that coverage is triggered when property damage manifests); New Hampshire
Ball Bearings v. Aetna Cas., No. C-87457-L, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at 32 (D.NH. filed
April 1, 1994)(holding coverage triggered at time contamination reasonably capable of
discovery). One defense attorney observed that the enactment of a manifestation
theory may cause manufacturers to go out of business and preclude injured plaintiffs
from having a source of recovery. Podgers, supra note 137, at 141 (adopting view of
Frederick Baron of Dallas).
139. See e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981) (discussing the distinction
between manifestation and exposure theories advanced by the parties). A related, but
different issue involves the question of what event tolls the statute of limitations in a
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commences when the reasonable person would be conscious of the
existence of an actionable defect. 140 The manifestation theory,
therefore, mandates that the policy in effect at the point in time when
the damage or injury is first discovered covers the loss.
1. Manifestation of Loss Under First Party Coverage
Courts, in applying the manifestation of loss trigger-of-coverage, often
distinguish between insurance policies providing first party coverage
and third party policy coverage. 141 "First party" insurance coverage re-
quires an insurer to compensate the insured for injuries to the insured
or the insured's property.'42 The first party manifestation cases include
losses resulting from earth movement, construction defects, and
repeated-exposure to the elements.
cause of action. Most courts hold that the statute of limitations begins to run when a
plaintiff discovers the injury. See Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155,
159-60 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding statute of limitations does not begin to run until dam-
age is discovered); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 394 A.2d 299, 305 (Md. 1978)
(holding discovery rule applies to statute of limitations in latent disease cases); but
see Thorton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003-04 (N.Y. 1979) (holding plaintiff
may not invoke discovery rule since statute of limitations begins to run from point of
actual injury and not from point of discovery of disease).
140. American Home Assurance Co. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22, 30 (1st
Cir. 1986). Cf. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Black, 717 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984) (holding that Congress intended that the "employer
during the last employment in which the claimant was exposed to injurious stimuli
prior to the date upon which the claimant became aware of the fact that he was
suffering from an occupational disease . . . should be liable").
141. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1232, 1246
(Cal. 1990) (noting the distinction between first-party and third-party coverage). One
court denied coverage, interpreting the word "accident" not to be the time of the
damage-causing act but the time when the party was damaged. Maples v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 80, 83 (Ct. App. 1978). It should be noted, however,
that the cases discussed in this Article deal mainly with the 1966 and 1973 CGL
policies and generally interpret how "occurrence," not "accident," is defined.
142. Richard L. Antognini, When Will My Troubles End? The Loss in Progress De-
fense in Progressive Loss Insurance Cases, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 419 n.1 (1992); see
also Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 P.2d 704, 705 n.2 (Cal. 1989)
(discussing the distinction between first and third party insurance). Although this
Article focuses on third party insurance, the courts' use of various trigger theories is
illustrated in both the first party and the third party insurance contexts.
a. Earth movement causing first party loss
One of the first cases to apply the manifestation of loss theory in the
first party insurance is Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.' In
Snapp, the insurer asserted that the homeowner policy did not cover
the damage caused by movement of unstable fill.'" Recognizing that
new losses materialized during the insurer's policy period and pro-
gressed after the expiration of the policy term, the court rejected the
contention of the insurer and concluded that the date of materialization
of the loss determines which carrier must indemnify for a loss suffered
by the insured.4 Thus, according to the court in Snapp, the time at
which damage is discovered determines the manifestation of the
loss.'46
b. Construction defects causing first party loss
In addition to cases involving damage caused by earth movement, the
manifestation theory has frequently been applied to cover the damage
caused by construction defects involving first party insurance.'47 In
Home Insurance Co. v. Landmark Insurance Co.,"' the issue involved
which of two first party insurers was liable for the loss from progres-
sive property damage spanning successive policy periods.'49 The court
found the first insurer solely liable, determining that the date of mani-
festation determines which carrier must provide indemnity for a loss
143. 24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Ct. App. 1962). See supra text accompanying notes 93-97 for
analysis of the Snapp holding that losses must be contingent before insurance cover-
age applies.
144. Id. at 829. See, e.g., Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 295 P.2d 19, 22 (Ct.
App. 1956) (holding insurer carrying the policy in effect at the time property damage
occurred liable).
145. Id. at 831-32.
146. Id. Insurance coverage for cases involving injuries caused by defective products
and servicing of those products also apply the discovery rule to the statute of limita-
tions. See Scott v. Keever, 512 P.2d 346 (Kan. 1973) (sale of product occurred during
policy period, but injury occurred after expiration of policy); Insurance Co. of N. Am.
v. Sam Harris Constr. Co., 583 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Cal. 1978) (finding coverage for negli-
gent servicing of an airplane within the policy period although damage occurred after
policy period had expired).
147. The effects of trigger of coverage decisions adverse to the construction indus-
try include more difficulty in obtaining insurance coverage, less certainty of coverage
in a given case, increase in deductibles, and extreme escalation of attorneys' fees.
Jullian J. Hubbard, Defect Claims Keep Escalating While Coverage is at a Premium,
48 Bus. J. SAN JOSE, 29 (March 18, 1991).
148. 253 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1988).
149. Id. at 278. The concrete facade of the insured's hotel began to manifest visible
deterioration, becoming progressively worse and extending through the expiration of
Home's coverage and into the inception of the Landmark policy. Id.
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suffered by the insured."u Although Home was a first party case, in-
surers could not rely on its precedent because the holding was fact spe-
cific '5 and has been subsequently questioned.52
c. Repeated exposure causing first party loss
Some courts, however, have applied the manifestation theory of cov-
erage to the first party context when the loss involves repeated and
progressive exposure to the damage-causing event.'53 In Pru-
dential-LMI Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,'' for example, repeated
soil subsidence caused progressive property damage. Despite a policy
that covered the plaintiff during the three years that the damage alleg-
edly occurred, the insurer denied coverage.""
The Prudential-LMI court held that in a first party property damage
case, the carrier insuring the property at the time of manifestation of
loss is singularly responsible for indemnification.' According to this
court, the manifestation of loss theory is appropriate for claims of con-
tinuing and progressive property damage where the injury is "immedi-
150. Id. at 280. One commentator noted that the Home Insurance court may not
have relied upon the holdings of the personal injury disease cases because property
damage, unlike asbestosis, does not progress "slowly for many years before there are
any discernable symptoms." Raoul D. Kennedy, Primary, Excess, and Reinsurer Dis-
putes, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT CLAIMS 1989, at 351 (PLI Commercial Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 495, 1989). There may, however, be actual
types of property damage that do progress slowly before the damage manifests itself.
151. Home Ins. Co, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 280-82.
152. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1245 n.8
(Cal. 1990) (questioning Home's applicability to first party cases because the Home
court failed to distinguish between first party and third party policy language).
Home's uncertain status exemplifies the dilemma courts encounter when deciding
which coverage theory to apply.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 154-58. A distinction exists between single-
occurrence progressive loss cases and multiple-occurrence progressive loss cases. Sin-
gle-occurrence progressive loss cases involve one occurrence that becomes progres-
sively worse and causes damage. See e.g., Home Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79.
The multiple-occurrence cases involve repeated exposure to, for example, surface
water, causing residential damage. See e.g., Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 3
Cal. Rptr. 2d 622, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
154. 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
155. Id. at 1233-34. The insurer argued that because the insured had installed carpet
two years after coverage had ended and found no signs of cracking, there was no
soil subsidence during its policy term. Id.
156. Id. at 1246.
ate, cumulative, and exacerbated by repeated exposure."5 ' However,
the Prudential-LMI court stated that it would leave the issue of third-
party claims stemming from repeated and progressive property damage
for a later case."M
2. Manifestation of Loss Under Third Party Policy Coverage
a. Third party bodily injury claims
Unlike first party coverage, third party coverage requires the insurer
to compensate the insured for a loss in which the insured becomes
liable to a third party.'59 In Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.," " the court considered whether to adopt the
manifestation theory or the exposure theory when dealing with third-
party coverage involving bodily injury.'6' In Eagle-Picher, numerous
plaintiffs sued an asbestos manufacturer, alleging that exposure to the
manufacturer's products over the course of two decades resulted in
personal injury and wrongful death."'2 Seeking to avoid coverage, two
of the insurers argued that their policies were only triggered by mani-
festation of asbestosis, and not by the claimants' exposure to the prod-
uct. " Two other insurers desired that the loss be apportioned on a
pro rata basis among all insurers, and thus argued that exposure to the
product, not manifestation of illness, triggered coverage."'4
In determining that the manifestation theory was the proper trigger of
coverage, the court stated that CGL policies make a clear distinction
157. Id. (emphasis added). In Central National Insurance Co., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
622, the court adopted the Prudential-LMI holding and applied it to first party loss
involving repeated and progressive construction defects. Id. at 626.
158. Prudential-LM, 798 P.2d at 1246. A California court concluded that in first
party cases the policy in effect when the manifestation of damage occurs should
cover the injury completely, despite the fact that the true severity of the damage
might not be discoverable until long after the lapse of the policy. Pines of La Jolla
Homeowners Assoc. v. Industrial Indem., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (ap-
plying manifestation theory to construction case).
159. See supra note 141 and accompanying text for an explanation of the difference
between first party and third party coverage.
160. 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
161. Id. at 16.
162. Id. at 15. It would not be surprising for those insurers, who desired a manifes-
tation theory, to turn around and argue for an exposure theory in a subsequent case
if such a theory favored noncoverage. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text for
an example of how parties attempt to convince the courts to adopt different theories
depending on the interests at stake. One solution might be for the policy to directly
spell out which trigger of coverage theory will control in the event that a suit is
filed against the insurer.
163. Id. at 16.
164. Id.
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between the act creating the injury and the resulting injury itself."
The Eagle-Picher court reasoned that due to thp act-result distinction,
even when a disease exists in a dormant state, bodily injury, and there-
fore coverage, does not occur until the disease becomes "manifest or
active.""
b. Third party property damage claims
In addition to bodily injury claims, the manifestation of loss trigger-
of-coverage can be seen in third party property damage cases. In
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"7 two
insurance companies issued to a construction company several liability
policies during successive policy periods." Although Fireman's was
the carrier when the construction defects were initially discovered,
Aetna was the carrier at risk when the defects progressed and their
cause became known." Applying the manifestation of loss theory to
third party insurance, the court held that the carrier of the risk during
the original manifestation of loss is solely responsible for the insured's
coverage. 70
C. The Injury-in-Fact Theory of Triggering Coverage
Under the injury-in-fact theory of triggering coverage, the policy is
triggered when an injury or damage actually occurs, irrespective of the
time of exposure or discovery. 7' The injury-in-fact trigger of coverage
165. Id. at 19. Apparently, the distinction between exposure and manifestation is not
as clear as the Eagle-Picher court would suggest. One commentary has pointed out
that a "pure" manifestation approach is actually applied less than any other theory.
Michael A. Pope & Edward D. Rickert, Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims: Insur-
ance Disputes at the Primary, Excess, and Reinsurance Level, in ENVIRONMENTAL
AND Toxic TORT CLAiMS 291 (1989).
166. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 20.
167. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1621 (1990).
168. Id. at 1623.
169.. Id.
170. Id. at 1630. The court referred to the manifestation rule as "delayed discovery,"
holding that a loss is not manifest until a party "actually discovers or reasonably
should have discovered his injury and its negligent cause." Id.
171. G.Z. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 103, at 143. See also United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 197 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (holding injury-in-fact to be trigger
under Missouri law); Independent Petrochem. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654
F. Supp. 1334, 1344 (D.D.C.), modified, 672 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1986) (explaining inju-
ry-in-fact theory); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1387-88
merits discussion, despite its less enthusiastic application when com-
pared to other approaches."
The first application of the injury-in-fact theory was as a judicial
attempt to bring much needed consistency to the "conceptual chaos of
the trigger of coverage controversy."" In American Home Products
Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,74 fifty-four claimants sued a
pharmaceuticals manufacturer for injuries caused by several of its prod-
ucts."v5 The court noted that while injury may closely follow exposure,
there may be cases in which exposure is not immediately followed by
injury, and thus, the manifestation theory should be rejected.'76 In par-
ticular, affidavits by CGL draftsmen that the policy was created to cov-
er for the occurrence of actual injury, not just injuries that became
discoverable during the policy period, convinced the court to dispose of
the manifestation theory.'77
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding injury-in-fact or actual injury to trigger coverage in bodily
injury case); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367, 371
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that showing of injury-in-fact required to trigger coverage in
bodily injury case); Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, 478
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (explaining injury-in-fact theory); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Longden, 197 Cal. App. 3d 226, 231 (1987) (holding that time of occurrence is time
of actual damage); Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wassau, 746 F.
Supp. 1310, 1324-25 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding injury-in-fact the applicable coverage
trigger).
172. Pope & Rickert, supra note 165, at 296. It is surprising that so few courts
have adopted the injury-in-fact trigger. From a logical standpoint, the theory has a
certain attractiveness. For example, CGL policies which cover "occurrences," allowing
insurers to show the actual time of occurrence, such as injury-in-fact, would be de-
sirable.
173. See David J. Dykhouse and Joseph L. Falik, Trigger of Coverage: The Business
Context, the Plain Language, and American Home Products, 16 CONN. L. REV. 497,
512 (1984).
174. 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984).
175. Id. at 762. In pharmaceuticals cases, the injury-in-fact theory may be more
appropriate than the exposure theory because the initial ingestion of drugs often does
not cause immediate injury. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 8
(2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the injury caused by the ingestion of a pregnancy drug is
actually suffered "in utero" rather than at ingestion); Emons Indus., Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding both ingestion
and subsequent actual injury to be "potentially liability producing").
176. American Home Prod., 748 F.2d at 764. The court explained that exposure
does not equal injury because an injury could clearly occur during the policy period,
while the exposure that caused it preceded that period. Id. This explanation lends
credence to the notion that exposure as a trigger is only appropriate when applied to
injuries occurring almost immediately after exposure. See infra note 193 and accom-
panying text for an explanation of how some of these unique characteristics exist in
the disease of asbestosis.
177. Id. at 765. According to one commentator, the changes made in the standard-
ized CGL policy after 1966 were in response to consumer demand for a wider scope
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After the American Home Products decision, some courts began
applying the injury-in-fact rule under other rationales. In Abex Corp. v.
Maryland Casualty Co.," when an asbestos brake lining manufactur-
er (Abex) was named as a defendant in more than 200 tort cases, its
insurers refused to defend the company in the underlying tort
claims." The Second Circuit, attempting to apply New York law, de-
termined the injury-in-fact theory is the appropriate trigger-of-coverage
and commented, "[t]he plain language of the definition of 'occurrence'
used in the CGL policy requires exposure that 'results, during the policy
period in bodily injury' in order for an insurer to be obligated to indem-
nify the insured. Any argument that mere exposure-without inju-
ry-triggers liability is simply unsound linguistically.""8
However, despite the apparent simplicity of the injury-in-fact trigger
theory, courts have refused to give the theory widespread acceptance
and commentators rarely mention it. 8'
D. The Continuous Trigger Theory of Policy Coverage
1. Basic Rule and Policy Rationales
The continuous trigger of coverage theory combines the basic princi-
ples of all the trigger theories."" The theory operates on the basic as-
of coverage. Bruce D. Hall, Contractors' Liability Insurance for Property Damage
Incidental to Normal Operations-The Standard Coverage Problem, 16 KAN. L. REV.
181, 203 (1968).
178. 790 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
179. Id. at 122-23. The court observed that because of the difficulty in determining
the commencement of asbestos-caused injury, the various parties involved each had
different viewpoints with respect to when coverage was triggered. Id. at 121. If all
parties to an insurance contract understand the effect of the various trigger theories,
as in this case, perhaps the standardized CGL policy can be modified by the parties
to explicitly include a provision on what event triggers coverage under a policy.
180.. Id. at 127. Often, the determination of which trigger of coverage theory to
apply in federal court ultimately depends on how the district court resolves the
choice of law issue. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 1, 7
(D.D.C. 1984)(holding that Indiana law governs trigger of coverage issue), ofj'd, 764
F.2d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.,
654 F. Supp. 1334, 1345 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that choice of law determines trigger-
of-coverage issue).
181. There is a significant number of commentaries on the trigger of coverage that
fail to even mention the injury-in-fact trigger theory. See, e.g., Arness & Eliason, su-
pra note 12; Earnest, supra note 9.
182. Agrawal, supra note 15, at 1495 n.34.
sumption that indemnification and defense liability extends to all insur-
ers on the risk from initial exposure to final manifestation of loss.'"
The continuous trigger-of-coverage theory is also commonly referred to
as the "triple trigger theory" because exposure, exposure in residence,
the stage between exposure and manifestation, and manifestation of
loss trigger coverage all act as triggers-of-coverage.'" One court, in
applying the continuous trigger theory, held that all insurers who were
on the risk for coverage during any of three stages were jointly and
severally liable."
There are several policy rationales behind applying the continuous
trigger-of-coverage theory instead of the alternate trigger theories. One
district court, in deciding to apply a continuous trigger theory, found
that the fundamental reason for adopting one theory over the other is
to give the insured maximum coverage.' In its application of the con-
tinuous trigger theory in one case, the Third Circuit reasoned that this
theory was appropriate in light of the policy of strict construction of
coverage against insurers.'87 The continuous trigger theory was also
utilized by a state court after it decided that the policy term "bodily
injury" was too ambiguous and imprecise for any other theory."
Whatever the policy reasons behind the different applications of the
continuous trigger theory, it is important to explore its impact in the
contexts of bodily injury and property damage, where it is most often
applied.
2. The Continuous Trigger Theory Applied to Bodily Injury Claims
In terms of personal bodily injury claims against the insured, the
continuous trigger theory operates upon the presumption that an injury,
183. Earnest, supra note 9, at 67.
184. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 103, at 639.
185. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding that the continuous trigger theory allows the insured to select whichever
policy falls in the trigger policy); see also Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. Ameri-
can Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 1556 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that applica-
tion of continuous trigger results in joint and several liability); Chemical Leaman
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136 (D.N.J. 1993)
(same); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1334, 1354 (D.N.J. 1992)
(same).
186. Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1409
(E.D. Tex. 1988) (citations omitted). Without a continuous trigger theory, the insured
will be forced to forever maintain the same level of coverage because otherwise the
insured will be without coverage if the accident takes place after the policy has ex-
pired. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 107, § 58.05.
187. ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1985).
188. Vale Chem. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 490 A.2d 896, 901 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985), revd, 516 A.2d 684 (1986).
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such as a disease, becomes worse with time." One commentator ex-
pressed this presumption in the form of a formula: "[Alt year X the
condition is less serious than it is a X + L.""° Courts originally applied
the continuous trigger-of-coverage to cases involving asbestos-caused
personal injury claims'9' and later extended the application of the the-
ory to personal injury cases resulting from other causes."
a. Coverage for asbestos personal injury claims
Because asbestos has a slow breakdown and contamination, it is a
more likely candidate for application of the continuous trigger-of-cover-
age. "' 3 In Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America," a case
involving coverage for bodily injury caused by asbestos, the D.C. Circuit
applied the continuous trigger-of-coverage after an insulation manufac-
turer sought a declaration as to its rights under several CGL poli-
cies. 95 Plaintiffs, alleging that the insured's products gave them asbes-
tosis and other maladies, filed multiple lawsuits against the insured.""
After being sued, Keene tendered the claims to its insurers with the
expectation that the insurers would provide defense and indemnifica-
tion."'97 However, each of Keene's insurers either partially or com-
pletely denied coverage."8
189. Arness, supra note 12, at 972.
190. Id.
191. See infra notes 193-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the continu-
ous trigger theory in the context of asbestos-caused bodily injury claims.
192. See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text (discussing the continuous trig-
ger theory in the context of non-asbestos bodily injury claims).
193. Asbestosis evolves without symptoms for a long period of time although the
first actual tissue injury occurs immediately after the inhalation of the asbestos.
Home Ins. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281 (Ct. App. 1988). As a result,
some courts "view each deposit of scar tissue as a separate occurrence of bodily
injury in a continuing tort." Id.
194. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
195. Id. at 1038.
196. Id. at 1042-43. The first case to consider legal liability stemming from the con-
traction of asbestosis was Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). In Borel, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
an asbestos manufacturer's failure to warn a worker about the danger of contracting
asbestosis from handling its product created an "unreasonably dangerous condition"
and was therefore actionable. Id. at 1093.
197. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1042-43.
198. Id. at 1043. Not only have insurers reacted to the trigger of coverage issue by
denying coverage, but they have also raised coverage prices and limited the amount
Several of the insurers argued for adoption of a manifestation ap-
proach, suggesting that only manifestation of asbestosis or other dis-
ease would trigger coverage.'" On the other hand, Keene and one of
its insurers argued for an exposure approach, contending that mere
exposure to asbestos constitutes an injury."°
The Keene court, however, rejected both the manifestation and expo-
sure theories and, instead, allowed three separate triggers of policy
coverage to operate." ' The manifestation theory applied because it
comports with the reasonable expectations of the insured, and the ex-
posure and exposure-in-residence theories applied because a harmful
process may be underway before a latent disease actually manifests
itself.2"2 The D.C. Circuit combined the three triggers into one theory
and concluded that if a policy is in effect during any portion of the
continuous "injurious process," coverage is triggered and the insurer is
liable."°
At least one commentator has criticized Keene's reliance on the
insured's expectations in approving the continuous trigger theory, stat-
ing that an insured cannot reasonably expect to be provided with cover-
age twenty years after the expiration of the policy.2' Nevertheless,
since Keene, numerous courts have adopted the continuous trigger
approach of providing three triggers-of-coverage to an insured who is
sued for personal injury and property damage.2"'
of coverage available. See generally INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT at VI-11 to 24 (1978); see Dykhouse &
Falik, supra note 173, at 499. The problems illustrated by Keene, therefore, include
problems for potential insureds nationwide as well as those in the case. The fact that
there is no industry preference for a particular trigger of coverage theory has compli-
cated the issue. Adjudicating Liability, supra note 45, at 745. Because it is not clear
which theory would prompt insurers to increase coverage and lower prices, the prob-
lem resists a "quick fix" solution.
199. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1042-43.
200. Id. at 1042.
201. Id. at 1042-43. It is odd that the Keene court did not attempt to resolve this
ambiguity in favor of the insured. Courts almost universally agree that contracts are
to be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage when an ambiguity
presents itself in the policy language. WILLIAM R. VANCE & BUIST M. ANDERSON, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 809 (3d ed. 1951); see supra notes 51-66 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the construction of ambiguities in insurance policies.
202. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1044-45.
203. Id. at 1047. One commentator observed that although the Keene decision was
widely criticized by the insurance industry, the decision was correct in light of the
standard policy language, insurance industry evidence, medical evidence of how and
when an injury occurs, and earlier decisions in the non-asbestosis context.
204. Agrawal, supra note 15, at 1513-14.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 206-23 for a discussion of the various con-
texts that the courts have applied the continuous trigger approach.
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b. Coverage for non-asbestos personal injury claims
Some courts find that the continuous trigger-of-coverage theory is
applicable in the non-asbestos context as well. In Eli Lilly and Co. v.
Home Insurance Co.,' the court faced a difficult trigger issue when it
identified the proper scope of a liability coverage for a drug designed to
prevent miscarriages which caused cervical cancer years after patients
ingested it. 7 The manufacturer urged the court to adopt the "multiple
trigger" approach, making all of the insurers liable for indemnification
and defense at any time between exposure to the drug and manifesta-
tion of a drug-related disease.'
The court of appeal turned to principles of insurance construction
and determined that Indiana law requires a finding that a policy is am-
biguous before applying a multiple-trigger theory.' Holding that the
policy was ambiguous as to the terms "injury" and "occurs," the court
construed the policy against the insurers and utilized a continuous trig-
ger-of-coverage theory."'
3. The Continuous Trigger Theory Applied to Property Injury Claims
Critics of the continuous trigger theory in the property damage con-
text point out that property damage is different from progressive dis-
eases in that property damage characteristically does not "become
worse with time.""' Notwithstanding this criticism, a few courts have
extended the continuous trigger-of-coverage theory to the property
damage context.
a. Coverage for asbestos property ddmage claims
In Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance,
206. 794 F.2d 710 (D.D.C. 1986).
207. Id. at 712-13.
208. Id. at 713.
209. Id. at 714.
210. Id. at 722. Despite the principle of construction that mandates that ambiguities
be construed against the insurer, a more general principle of contract interpretation
involves ascertaining the true intent of parties who enter into a contract. VANCE &
BUIST, supra note 201, at 809. It is hard to predict whether a court will still interpret
ambiguities against the insurer when it is apparent that such a construction does not
embody the true intent of the parties to the insurance contract.
211. Arness, supra note 12, at 972.
Co.,22 the insured argued that the existence of asbestos within a build-
ing causes "continuing damage" to the property; therefore, all insurers
on the risk from the time of installation to removal are liable to the
insured.2"' Recognizing that the issue was one of first impression, the
court reasoned that an approach that provides a continuous trigger in
bodily injury cases, but only a single trigger in property damage cases,
is "illogical" and "impractical.""' Because asbestos undergoes "a slow,
continuous degradation," the district court concluded that the same fac-
tors apply equally to both property damage and bodily injury scenari-
os.
215
b. Coverage for non-asbestos property damage claims
More recently, some courts have applied the continuous trigger theo-
ry to non-asbestos property damage scenarios. In a case currently under
review by the California Supreme Court, Montrose Chemical Corp. v.
Admiral Insurance Co., 211 the court faced the issue of coverage in the
context of long-term toxic contamination. 27 The insured, Montrose,
manufactured pesticides from 1947 to 1982.2"8 The insurer, Admiral,
issued four CGL policies to Montrose spanning from 1982 to 1986, dur-
ing which time five plaintiffs filed separate actions against Montrose be-
cause of Montrose's ineffective storage of chemicals.2"9 Admiral con-
tended that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Montrose because
the loss, or contamination, had occurred prior to its policy periods.
In resolving the trigger of coverage problem, the Montrose court re-
lied on several rationales. First, the court speculated that insureds who
purchase third party insurance generally have no way to gauge their
future potential liability to others, and therefore, reasonably expect to
212. 613 F. Supp. 1549 (D.N.J. 1985).
213. Id. at 1560.
214. Id. at 1560-61.
215. Id. at 1561. Asbestos degradation is such a slow process that even if all asbes-
tos products were banned today, the projections for asbestos-related deaths into the
next century exceed 200,000. Adjudicating Liability, supra note 45, at 739 n.1.
216. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. granted, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661 (Cal.
1992).
217. Id. at 360.
218. Id. Experts now conclude that the average cost of decontaminating a typical
toxic waste site is about $12 million, including $800,000 to analyze the site, $7.2 mil-
lion to clean up the site, and $4.1 million in post-cleanup costs. WARREN FREEDMAN,
HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY 530 (1987).
219. Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360. Ineffective waste disposal can occur through
overfilling tanks, corroding tanks and pipes, or through fiberglass tanks rupturing.
Steffen W. Plehn, An Introduction to LUST, in 1984 HAZARDOUS WASTE AMENDMENTS
AND SUPERFUND DEVELOPMENTS: TilE TOUGH NEW REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 6 (1985).
[Vol. 21: 813, 19941 Continuous Trigger
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
be covered by more than one policy if a loss occurs.20 Second, the
court rejected the manifestation rule because "occurrence" was defined
in the policy as "continuous or repeated exposure to conditions" that
resulted in a loss, not as the discovery of a loss itself." Finally, the
Montrose court noted that "occurrence" policies such as Montrose's
policy cover pre-policy occurrences, thus, they are distinct from less
expensive policies covering "claims made" during the policy period.'
In the court's opinion, the continuous trigger approach was correct
because the drafters of the CGL policy envisioned that successive poli-
cies would be used by insureds to cover progressive and continuing
losses.'
IV. IMPACT
A. The Current Problem Created by the Conflict
The divergence of theories on what events trigger coverage under
CGL policies is a problem in need of a solution."4 Whichever trigger
220. Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366-67. Analysts have reacted with mixed feelings
to the reasonable expectations rationale as a basis for the continuous trigger theory.
See, e.g., R. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83
HARv. L. REV. 961 (1970) (supporting rationale); Insurance Liability in the Asbestos
Disease Context-Application of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 27 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 239, 257 (noting that courts may unrealistically find reasonable expectations
under continuous trigger theory); Agrawal, supra note 15, at 1513 (observing that
reasonable expectations rationale is "frought with difficulties"). The calculated risk
that an insured takes when contemplating how much insurance coverage is available
cannot be underrated. The basic essence of insurance stems from its utility in han-
dling uncertainties associated with risk and spreading those risks in such a way that
individual losses can be effectively managed for the benefit of the insured. FREEDMAN,
supra note 218, at 527.
221. Id. at 363-65.
222. Id. at 367.
223. Id. at 369. One district court adopted a continuous trigger approach, reasoning
that an injury caused by a continuous process should result in a continuous trigger-
of-coverage. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1163 (W.D. Mich.
1988). It would be a mistake, however, to assume that a continuous injury necessarily
will compel a court to apply a continuous trigger-of-coverage. See, e.g., Gruol Constr.
Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427, 431 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding
that only insurers while loss is progressing are liable). On the other hand, Gruol
decidedly represents a minority view. Lathrop, supra note 2, § 32.09.
224. One specific area of the problem, represented by latent disease claims caused
by exposure to contaminants, represents a "ticking time bomb." Podgers, supra note
theory the particular court applies, the implications of that decision for
the insureds and insurers are dramatic and far reaching. 5 Despite in-
terpreting identical language as presented in the provisions of the CGL
policies, different courts utilize different theories of triggering policy
coverage. 6 In addition, quantifying how many new theories may ap-
pear in the future is difficult because the legal system is coerced into
finding new ways to handle the increase in latent disease suits."7 The
courts have also applied the theories inconsistently, as the supposedly
"express terms" of CGL policies do not mandate the use of one theory
over another."s
Insurance companies typically attempt to use the inconsistencies
surrounding the trigger-of-coverage issue to their advantage. Insurers
urge courts to adopt different trigger theories in different cases depend-
ing upon which theory works best to their advantage.2" Naturally, as
the trigger-of-coverage controversy erupted, businesses and their insur-
ers each insisted on different theories of triggering coverage depending
upon their respective interests in the particular case.' °
The trigger-of-coverage dilemma has adversely affected both insurers
and insureds. Due to the existence of uncertain liability and coverage,
both sides of the insurance contract suffer from the absence of a uni-
form approach.
1. Problems of the Insured Due to the Trigger of Coverage Dilemma
As a result of the manipulation of the trigger issue by insurers, an
136, at 140.
225. Michael A. Pope & Edward D. Rickert, Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims:
Insurance Disputes at the Primary, Excess and Reinsurance Level, ENVIRONMENTAL
AND Toxic TORT CLAIMS: INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1989 AND BEYOND 349 (1989).
226. See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61-62 (3d
Cir. 1982) (holding first manifestation of loss triggers coverage); American Home As-
surance Co. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding time
of reasonable discovery triggers coverage); Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem.
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, 487 (holding injury-in-fact triggers coverage); Sandoz, Inc. v.
Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257, 265-66 (D.N.J. 1983) (holding the
wrongful act triggers coverage).
227. Podgers, supra note 137, at 140. As the courts have developed different theo-
ries in order to maximize coverage, the courts have "failed to create a uniform judi-
cial interpretation of 'occurrence.'" Judith M. Nixon, The Problem With RCRA-Do the
Financial Responsibility Provisions Really Work? 36 Am. U. L. REv. 133, 147 (1986).
Ironically, by desiring to maximize coverage to the insured in a particular case, the
courts instead may have created uncertainty for future plaintiffs unable to determine
which trigger theory is applicable in a given case.
228. Wrubel, supra note 41, at 669.
229. Senne, supra note 104, at 1128 n.7.
230. See Dykhouse & Falik, supra note 173, at 501-02.
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insured suffers when insurers dispute their coverage obligations by
asserting different trigger theories.23' In addition, insureds have faced
increased difficulty in purchasing insurance; insurers, reacting to mas-
sive increases in litigation due to coverage uncertainty, have reduced
the amount of coverage available to potential insureds. 2
2. Problems Caused to the Insurer Due to the Trigger of Coverage
Dilemma
Insurers suffer as their insureds begin to go out of business in the
face of increased liability, resulting in insurers issuing policies without
the ability to assess their potential future obligations.' Furthermore,
the host of problems related to the lack of a uniform approach to the
trigger-of-coverage dilemma is not confined to the present. The unre-
solved conflict over which trigger theory applies in a given situation
threatens to produce numerous problems in the future if left unre-
solved.
B. The Future Dangers of Not Resolving the Conflict
The divergence of theories concerning what events trigger coverage
under CGL policies presents potential long-term problems. For instance,
one of the greatest challenges facing the legal system involves "dealing
effectively with the swarm of litigation spawned by asbestos, toxic
wastes and other substances" whose damage may not be completely
realized for many years.' Another commentator predicted that the
problem threatens to dismantle not only the legal system, but "the pub-
231. One commentator has advanced the proposition that insurance companies
would likely not provide insurance, provide insufficient coverage, or provide it at
unreasonable rates due to the uncertainty of the law in the trigger-of-coverage area.
Nixon, supra note 227, at 137. A legislative solution to the trigger issue could resolve
the uncertainty regarding the trigger-of-coverage dilemma. However, developing poli-
cies on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach would then burden insurers. Further-
more, it seems inefficient for an insured's coverage to depend on the particular juris-
diction in which he or she is located.
232. See Hubbard, supra note 147, at 29 (illustrating how insurers began to "shrink"
coverage available to potential insureds due to increased litigation).
233. Utilizing a uniform standard and eliminating the uncertainty surrounding the
trigger of coverage issue would allow insurers to lower prices due to increased accu-
racy in calculating their potential coverage obligations. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins.
v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1246 (Cal. 1990).
234. Arness & Eliason, supra note 12, at 943.
lic, the economy and the industrial marketplace as well." 5 However,
the most dire prediction was that the trigger issue, if left unresolved,
"may shake the foundations" of the tort system and damage the econo-
my of the United States." Regardless of which commentator accurate-
ly portrays the present and future severity of the problem, the common
imperative in all three views holds that the problem must be resolved.
C. A Proposed Method for Solving the Dilemma
A suggested process to resolve the trigger-of-coverage quagmire now
follows. However, notwithstanding whether this solution is ultimately
adopted, whatever solution is adopted should incorporate the relevant
policy interests and principles of construction in insurance law. 7 Fur-
thermore, the courts must adopt a universal solution, thus providing the
requisite amount of certainty necessary for equity to both sides of the
insurance contract." With these general principles in mind, a court
could deal with the trigger-of-coverage dilemma in the following man-
ner.
1. Presumption: Continuous Trigger of Coverage
As noted, the adopted solution should take into account relevant
principles of policy construction. Applying the initial presumption of the
continuous trigger theory, as opposed to the other theories previously
discussed, directly maximizes coverage available to the insured and
efficiently construes ambiguities in favor of the insured.
a. Maximizing the coverage available to the insured
If an important consideration in interpreting the trigger-of-coverage
question entails maximizing the amount of policy coverage available to
the insured," then a presumption in favor of the continuous trigger
235. Agrawal, supra note 15, at 1491.
236. Podgers, supra note 137, at 139.
237. See supra notes 44-97 and accompanying text for principles of construction
relevant to the interpretation of insurance contracts.
238. See supra note 220 for one court's view on the importance of developing a
uniform standard to establish a solution to the trigger-of-coverage problem.
239. The Ninth Circuit, in Hancock Labs., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 523
n.5 (9th Cir. 1985), noted that when construing the extent of coverage available to
the insured, general principals of insurance policy require interpreting the provisions
to "give effect" to the policy's central purpose of coverage. Because providing indem-
nification remains the central purpose of CGL policy coverage, courts have developed
various trigger theories to give the insured maximum coverage. Dayton Ind. School
Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (holding the
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theory is appropriate.24 In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Thomas Solvent Co.,24" ' the district court adopted the continuous trig-
ger theory of coverage, reasoning that courts usually adopt coverage
theories in order to "maximize coverage" to the insured.242 The pre-
sumption provides maximum coverage because the continuous trigger-
of-coverage theory provides three separate policy triggers, while the
other theories provide only one trigger.' 3 The in-fighting between vari-
ous insurers attempting to avoid coverage will not force the insured to
sit by the sidelines and wait for a winner to emerge, because the con-
tinuous trigger presumption guarantees coverage from the outset.
b. Resolving ambiguities in favor of the insured
The continuous trigger theory accords with the fundamental principle
of insurance construction that mandates that courts must resolve ambi-
guities in favor of coverage.244 Because insurers and insureds make
strong competing arguments for the adoption of four different theories,
it is apparent that certain ambiguities inherently exist in all of the theo-
ries.2 If courts must construe ambiguities in favor of coverage, it
time between asbestos installation and date of removal triggered coverage).
240. At least one court attempted this approach. In an unpublished trial court deci-
sion, one judge held that in the context of asbestos property damage cases, a pre-
sumption of continuous trigger should be applied. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases,
No. 1072, slip. op. at 22-24 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1988). The judge also determined
that an insurer could rebut the presumption by showing that no release of asbestos
occurred during its policy period. Id.
241. 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
242. Id. at 1163. The Thomas Solvent court did not discuss, however, what happens
when the desire to maximize coverage exceeds what the insured reasonably expected
to be covered for. An interesting hypothetical, apparently judicially unconfronted,
would ask whether to apply a continuous trigger theory or manifestation trigger theo-
ry when a reasonable insured would expect some loss but continuous trigger would
maximize coverage.
243. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
244. KEETON, supra note 16, at 351. Courts derive this theory from the basic propo-
sition that policy language should be interpreted as laypersons would comprehend it
and not through the eyes of "sophisticated underwriters." Id. The Second Circuit held
that this construction recognizes a great disparity between an insurer and insured's
understanding of the subject matter. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160
F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1947). For the Second Circuit's logic to remain consistent, if
disparity in knowledge of insurance law forms the basis for the ambiguity, it would
be logical not to apply the construction where both parties possessed the knowledge
of "sophisticated underwriters."
245. In other words, if the word "occurrence" was not inherently ambiguous, there
should be applied universally and each theory's ambiguities should be
resolved in favor of coverage. This result can be achieved by the adop-
tion of a continuous trigger theory, which is actually a combination of
all the trigger theories.246 The only issue remaining, therefore, is not
whether any insurer will pay, but rather which insurer will pay.
c. Application of the presumption
Returning to the hypothetical discussed in the introduction to this
Article,247 the continuous trigger theory would implicate the coverage
provisions of Insurer One, Insurer Two and Insurer Three. Insurer One
is liable because the ineffective disposal of chemicals constitutes the
first exposure. 8 Insurer Two is liable because its policy was in effect
during the exposure in residence, the continued leakage of the chemi-
cals.24 Finally, Insurer Three is liable because the damage became ap-
parent during its policy term.' As a result, the presumption provides
A with the maximum amount of coverage available because liability
simultaneously attaches to Insurer One, Insurer Two and Insurer
Three.25' A further result, if the solution is universally adopted, is that
the insurer and insured will know their rights and obligations when the
contract is entered into, rather than letting a court determine their
rights and obligations for them. The primary criticism of this approach
is that it may force the triggering of a policy provision when an injury,
would not be so many countervailing judicial theories as to when an occurrence hap-
pens.
246. The result also fulfills the reasonable expectations of insureds: that they will
receive coverage when they purchase insurance. See supra notes 67-72 and accom-
panying text for a description of the reasonable expectations doctrine.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8 for the hypothetical situation that illus-
trates the trigger of coverage dilemma facing the courts.
248. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 76
(E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that the exposure theory controls in an environmental
contamination case). But cf Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.,
677 F. Supp. 342, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that the date of dumping triggers
coverage).
249. See supra text accompanying note 183 for the definition of "exposure in resi-
dence."
250. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir.
1986) (holding that the date in which the hazardous waste leakage was discovered
triggers coverage).
251. In such a situation, some courts apportion damages between insurers whose
policies have been triggered. See, e.g., California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co.,
193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 471 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that, in a case involving cumulative
losses, both insurers were liable for half of the damages). Other courts hold that no
basis exists in CGL policies for the apportionment of defense and indemnification
costs on a pro rata basis. See, e.g., Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 514
N.E.2d 150, 165 (Ill. 1987) (holding that nothing in the policy provided for proration).
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in actuality, did not occur during the policy period. This disadvantage,
however, could be remedied by allowing an insurer to rebut the pre-
sumption of coverage with a showing of adequate proof.
2. Rebuttal: Injury-in-Fact
Despite the initial attractiveness of the continuous trigger theory, it
does not seem completely fair that an insurer who has tangible proof
that a loss occurred outside of its policy coverage should be estopped
from proving this fact."i In contrast, an insurer should be permitted to
prove when injury-in-fact occurred in order to rebut the presumption of
continuous trigger.' For example, in the hypothetical, suppose that a
court applied a rebuttable presumption of continuous trigger to Insurer
One, Insurer Two and Insurer Three. Insurer Three, whose policy was
triggered because the damage became apparent during its policy period,
could introduce evidence that the loss actually occurred during an earli-
er policy period. If the courts created a presumption in favor of contin-
uous trigger and allowed the presumption to be rebutted by a showing
of injury-in-fact, the end result would give the insured maximum cover-
age without forcing the insurer to cover a loss that did not occur during
its policy period."
252. An insured cannot rightfully expect an insurer to pay for a loss that did not
occur during its policy period because "[slense of personal responsibility . . . is one
of the ethical pillars of insurance." FREEDMAN, supra note 218, at 529; see also Time
Oil Co. v. Cigna Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1400, 1415 (W.D. Wash.
1990) (holding that insurance policies historically require "the utmost good faith").
253. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the injury-
in-fact theory of triggering coverage. It is fair to allow an insurer to rebut a pre-
sumption of continuous trigger by showing that an injury-in-fact is outside of its cov-
erage responsibility. Insurers should not be criticized for disputing coverage so long
as they are disputing coverage with legal justification. Hall, supra note 177, at 203.
254. According to some courts, insurance policies should be interpreted in the con-
text of the business purposes for which the parties contracted in the first place.
Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 399 F. Supp. 12, 17 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(holding that "occurrence" should be interpreted in light of the risk insured against);
Champion Int'l Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 546 F.2d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that courts should interpret policies in light of the "business purposes" of
the parties).
V. CONCLUSION
The problem explored in this Article has resulted in such a large in-
crease in asbestos-coverage lawsuits, that insurers are producing a new
version of the CGL policy that only provides coverage for the first inju-
ries that manifest themselves or the first claims made during the policy
period. u5 Under an optimistic viewpoint, such a new formulation of
CGL policies may someday resolve the present controversy surrounding
the trigger of coverage issue.
Looming in the background, however, are all of the 1966 and 1973
CGL policies that may be the subject of judicial controversy far into the
future.' As the problem stands now, with a divergence of trigger the-
ories, insureds are unsure whether they are adequately covered and in-
surers have no way of calculating their future liability." Thus, it is
crucial for the courts or the legislatures to institute a uniform standard
so that both insurer and insured may understand their respective rights
and obligations.
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255. Earnest, supra note 9, at 66. The new policy, based upon the claims made
within a policy period, is called an Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) policy.
Nixon, supra note 227, at 149. The EIL policy was developed because insurers were
reluctant to commit themselves for too long into the future, primarily because the
risks posed by hazardous wastes have such long latency periods. Id.
256. Because "years may separate inception and manifestation" of losses covered
under a policy, the current CGL policies typified by the 1966 and 1973 versions will
still require interpretation regarding trigger of coverage even if a new type of policy
is developed. See Nixon, supra note 227, at 136 for commentary on the ramifications
of open-ended liability in general.
257. The dramatic increase in environmental litigation and the liberal interpretation
of insurance policies has "combined to shock the insurance industry." Developments
in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1458, 1575 (1986).
258. Nicholas R. Andrea is an associate at Lynberg & Watkins, an insurance defense
law firm in Los Angeles, California.
